CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-SEARCH AND SEIZURE-RANDOM, WARRANTLESS, AND SUSPICIONLESS SEARCHES OF STUDENT ATHLETES

THROUGH URINALYSIS DRUG TESTING BY PUBLIC SCHOOL OFFICIALS DOES NOT VIOLATE FOURTH AMENDMENT- Vernonia Sch.

Dist. v. Acton, 115 S. Ct. 2386 (1995).
"Warrants are not required-unless they are. All searches and
seizures must be grounded in probable cause-but not on
Tuesdays."'
The primary purpose of the Fourth Amendment 2 is to secure
the rights of individuals3 from unreasonable searches4 and
1 Akhil Reed Amar, Article, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARv. L. REv.
757, 757 (1994).
2 See U.S. CONT. amend. IV. The Fourth Amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported
by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
Id.
The Fourth Amendment is applicable to the states through the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 30 (1963);
Wolf. v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27-28 (1949). The Fourth Amendment guarantees to
an individual privacy, dignity, and security against arbitrary acts by officers of the government. See Camara v. Municipal Ct., 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967). Although there are
many opinions as to what is reasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, "the Court has given weight to such factors as the intention of the Framers of
the Fourth Amendment, the uses to which the individual has put a location, and our
societal understanding that certain areas deserve the most scrupulous protection
from government invasion." Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 178 (1984) (citations omitted).
The Supreme Court established the exclusionary rule which provides for the suppression of evidence obtained unlawfully under the Fourth Amendment. See Keith A.
Fabi, Comment, The Exclusionary Rule: Not the "ExpressedJuice of the Woolly-Headed Thist/e,"35 BUFF. L. REv. 937, 937 (1986). In Weeks, the Court first recognized the exclusionary rule. SeeWeeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914). Moreover, 50 years
later, the Mapp Court extended the exclusionary rule to apply to state governments as
well. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 657, 660 (1961). Because a discussion of search
and seizure law is beyond the scope of this article, see generally THOMASJ. GARDNER &
VICTOR MANIAN, PRINCIPLES AND CASES OF THE LAW OF ARREST, SEARCH, AND SEIZURE
(1974); MICHELLE G. HERMANN, SEARCH AND SEIZURE CHECKLISTS (1996); 3 WAYNE R.

LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT (2d ed. 1987);
2 WILLIAM E. RINGEL, SEARCHES & SEIZURES, ARRESTS AND CONFESSIONS (2d ed. 1993)
[hereinafter ARRESTS AND CONFESSIONS]; RIcHARD VAN DUIZEND ET AL., THE SEARCH
WARRANT PROCESS (1985); BRAIDFORD P. WILSON, ENFORCING THE FOURTH AMENDMENT:
A JURISPRUDENTIAL HISTORY (1986); Anne Clark, The Exclusionary Rule, 84 GEO. L.J.

873 (1996); William J. Stuntz, The Substantive Origins of CriminalProcedure,105 YALE L.J.
393 (1995); Scott E. Sundby, "Everyman"'s Fourth Amendment: Privacy or Mutual Trust
Between Government and Citizen?, 94 COLUM. L. REv. 1751 (1994).
3 See U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The Fourth Amendment protects an individual as
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seizures5 by the government.6 Specifically, the Fourth Amendment
sets forth two distinct clauses: a prohibition against unreasonable
searches and seizures and a requirement that warrants be supported by probable cause. 7
well as his property. See id. Moreover, the Fourth Amendment provides protection to
people, rather than places. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
4 See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1349 (6th ed. 1990). A search is defined as:
[a]n examination of a person's house or other buildings or premises, or
of his person, or of his vehicle, aircraft, etc., with a view to the discovery
of contraband or illicit or stolen property, or some evidence of guilt to
be used in the prosecution of a criminal action for some crime or offense with which he is charged.
Id.; see also United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984) (holding that a search
occurs when a reasonable expectation of privacy is infringed upon).
5 See BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1359 (6th ed. 1990). A seizure of a person is defined as "the taking of one physically or constructively into custody and detaining
him, thus causing a deprivation of his freedom in a significant way, with real interruption of his liberty of movement." Id.; see also United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S.
544, 554 (1980) (explaining that a person has been seized as defined by the Fourth
Amendment only if "a reasonable person would have believed he was not free to
leave."). The Mendenhall Court's test is the current standard against which personal,
nonphysical seizures are gauged. See 2 ARRESTS AND CONFESSIONS § 13.2 (a), supra
note 2, at 13-11. In addition, a seizure of property is defined as a profound interference with an individual's interest in property. Soldal v. Cook County, Ill., 113 S. Ct.
538. 543 (1992).
6 See U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The state action doctrine applies to the concept that
individual constitutional rights are restrictions on government actors as opposed to
private individuals, businesses, or groups. See Donald Crowley, Student Athletes and
Drug Testing, 6 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 95, 100 (1995). Therefore, the Fourth Amendment
only affords protection to individuals against searches and seizures made by government officials. See Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 467 (1921). For example, if
someone other than a government official wrongfully seized papers and afterwards
the government came into possession of them, the papers could legally be used in
evidence. See id.; see also Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 213 (1960) (explaining
that the Fourth Amendment applies to officials acting on behalf of the federal government); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914) (holding that the Fourth
Amendment limits action of the federal government as opposed to individual misconduct of federal officials).
The Fourth Amendment, however, is not applicable to government action taken
against nonresident aliens outside of United States borders. See United States v.
Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 274-75 (1990); United States v. Aikins, 946 F.2d 608,
613 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding that Fourth Amendment protections were not available
in international waters to nonresident aliens).
7 See U.S. CONST. amend. IV. Many argue that the Fourth Amendment has two
separates clauses: the Reasonableness Clause and the Warrant Clause. See Cathy A.
Cox et al., An Emerging New Standardfor WarrantlessSearches and Seizures Based on Terry
v. Ohio, 35 MERCER L. REv. 647, 649 (1984). Confusion tends to arise over the two
separate clauses because they may be construed independently or dependently. See
id. at 649-50. Moreover, legal scholars argue over whether the probable cause, i.e.
suspicion, element of the warrant clause also applies to the Reasonableness Clause.
See Thomas K. Clancy, The Role of Individualized Suspicion in Assessing the Reasonableness
of Searches and Seizures, 25 U. MEM. L. REv. 483, 488 (1995).
The Reasonableness Clause explicitly states that the Fourth Amendment only ap-

232

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 27:230

Throughout much of the Fourth Amendment's jurisprudence,
the Court has acknowledged the tension between government authority and individual liberties.' Originally, the Fourth Amendment was narrowly defined by the Supreme Court as encompassing
a per se rule requiring searches and seizures to be accompanied by
a warrant granted upon a showing of probable cause.' In the past
plies to unreasonable searches and seizures. See United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675,
682 (1985). Moreover, the Fourth Amendment restricts unreasonable searches and
seizures that are conducted in an improper method. See Schmerber v. California, 384
U.S. 757, 768 (1966). The test for what is reasonable "depends upon all of the circumstances surrounding the search or seizure and the nature of the search or seizure
itself." United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 537 (1985) (citing New
Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 337-42 (1985)). Hence, the judiciary is afforded great
latitude as to what is a reasonable search or seizure. See PLOYVIOUS G. PLOYVIOU,
SEARCH & SEIZURE: CONSTITUTIONAL AND COMMON LAW 131 (1982).
Of the two clauses, the Warrant Clause is more stringent and its primary purpose
is to protect individuals' privacy interests from random searches and seizures or arbitrary acts of the government. See Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S.
602, 621-22 (1989). A warrant confirms to the individual that the search has been
authorized and that it is limited in scope. See id. at 622; United States v. Chadwick,
433 U.S. 1, 9 (1977); Camara v. Municipal Ct. 387 U.S. 523, 532 (1967). The Court,
however, has recognized that when there is a burden of obtaining a warrant that frustrates the government's purpose, the warrant requirement may be suspended. See
Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 603 (1981); United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311,
316 (1972); Camara,387 U.S. at 533.
8 See Camara, 387 U.S. at 528. "Though there has been general agreement as to
the fundamental purpose of the Fourth Amendment, translation of ... unreasonable
searches and seizures into workable guidelines . . . has for many years divided the
members of this Court." Id. at 528. See Brian J. Serr, Great Expectations of Privacy: A
New Model for Fourth Amendment Protection, 73 MINN. L. REv. 583, 583-84 (1989). The
Supreme Court acknowledged the potential battle between balancing government
power and individual rights early in the Fourth Amendment's history. See id at 584
n.4. In Burdeau v. McDowell the Court stated:
The Fourth Amendment gives protection against unlawful searches and
seizures.... Its origin and history clearly show that it was intended as a
restraint upon the activities of sovereign authority, and was not intended to be a limitation upon other than government agencies; as
against such authority it was the purpose of the Fourth Amendment to
secure the citizen in the right of unmolested occupation of his dwelling
and the possession of his property....
256 U.S. 465, 475 (1921); see also Christopher S. Hagge, Note, The Demise of Individualized Suspicion in Fourth Amendment Searches and Seizures, 31 TULSA L.J. 559, 559 (1996)
(asserting that there has been substantial legal debate over the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment since its ratification).
9 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967). Except under exigent circumstances, most searches and seizures must be accompanied by a warrant issued
upon probable cause. See id.; Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586 n.25 (1980);
Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 390 (1978); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298
(1967). In those situations where a warrant is not required, however, ordinarily probable cause or reasonableness must exist. See United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 42
(1976); United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 423 (1976); Carroll v. United States,
267 U.S. 132, 155-56 (1925).
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two decades, however, the Court has broadened the government's
authority under the Fourth Amendment by continuously emphasizing that neither warrants nor probable cause are "irreducible requirement[s] of a valid search"1" under the Fourth Amendment.1 1
The Court has upheld both warrantless and suspicionless
searches in private dwellings, 12 automobiles, 3 school-house environments, 1 4 work-related locales,1 5 and highly regulated industries 6 by reasoning that the decreased expectation of privacy in
these settings affords such an allowance. 1 7 Specifically, the
Supreme Court has held that where there is an existence of a "special need"' 8 by the state, the warrant and probable cause require10 T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 340; United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 560-61
(1976).
11 See T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 340. Although "both the concept of probable cause and
the requirement of a warrant bear on the reasonableness of a search, though in certain limited circumstances neither is required." Almeida-Sanchez v. United States,
413 U.S. 266, 277 (Powell,J., concurring); see also National Treasury Employees Union
v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 665-66 (1989) (explaining that "neither a warrant nor
probable cause, nor indeed, any measure of individualized suspicion, is an indispensable component of reasonableness in every circumstance").
12 See, e.g., United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 317 (1972) (upholding warrantless administrative inspection of pawn shop handling sporting weapons); Colonnade
Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72, 77 (1970) (upholding warrantless administrative search of liquor facility); United States v. Cobb, 975 F.2d 152, 156 (5th Cir.
1992) (upholding warrantless administrative search of trucking company because part
of the business was highly regulated due to motor vehicle salvage operation). Cf
Camara, 387 U.S. at 534, 538 (warrant was required for administrative searches of
private residences concerning safety inspections; however, probable cause was not a
requisite). But see See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 544 (1976) (warrant was required for administrative search of business for purposes of conducting a fire
inspection).
13 See, e.g., Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 469 U.S. 444, 455 (1990) (upholding sobriety checkpoint stops without a warrant or probable cause); United States
v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 545 (1976) (upholding police-administered checkpoints without a warrant or probable cause). But see Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648,
663 (1979) (finding that reasonable suspicion must be present in order for vehicles to
be randomly stopped by police).
14 See, e.g., Vernonia Sch. Dist. v. Acton, 115 S.Ct. 2386, 2391 (1995) (holding that
warrant and probable cause requirements were not necessary to conduct random
drug urinalysis tests on student athletes); T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 326 (noting that the
warrant and probable cause requirements were not necessary in a school setting).
15 See, e.g., O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 722, 724 (1987) (holding that
neither a warrant nor probable cause was necessary in order for an employer to
search an employee's office).
16 See, e.g., Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 634 (1989)
(observing that a warrant and probable cause were not required before mandatory
drug tests were conducted); National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489
U.S. 656, 679 (1989) (holding that neither a warrant nor probable cause was necessary to conduct drug tests on custom officials).
17 See cases cited supra notes 12-16.
18 See T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 352 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (holding that a high
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ments may be dispensable in search and seizure cases. 19 If the
state's circumstances are based on this "special needs" category, a
court will determine the reasonableness of the search or seizure
under the Fourth Amendment by balancing the government's interest in enforcement against the individual's right to privacy.2 °
Recently, drug testing cases have been afforded this "special
needs" status." Thus, searches through mandatory urinalysis drug
testing have been deemed constitutional absent a warrant or probable cause.2 2 The Supreme Court, in an effort to curb drugs and
violence in schools, has taken an activist role by allowing student
drug testing. 23 Some scholars, however, have suggested that the
school's interest in asserting order and discipline constituted a "special need" allowing a warrantless search of a student's purse by school administration).
19 See Skinner, 489 U.S. at 620; Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 665-66; American Fed'n of
Gov't Employees v. Roberts, 9 F.3d 1464, 1468 (9th Cir. 1993); see also Wildauer v.
Frederick County, 993 F.2d. 369, 373 (4th Cir. 1993) (state's "special need" to protect
foster children justified warrantless search of foster home); Dunn v. White, 880 F.2d
1188, 1196-97 (10th Cir. 1989) (per curiam) (state's "special need" to curb the spread
of AIDS in prison justified the testing of prisoners).
20 See T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 341; United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 703 (1983); Bell
v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559 (1979); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543,
555 (1976); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20-21 (1968); Camara v. Municipal Ct., 387 U.S.
523, 536-37 (1967).
21 See Vernonia Sch. Dist. v. Acton, 115 S. Ct. 2386, 2397 (1995) (upholding
mandatory drug testing due to "special needs" present in the school setting); Skinner,
489 U.S. at 620 (explaining that drug testing was constitutional due to "special needs"
in the railroad setting); Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 665-66 (articulating that drug testing
constituted "special needs" because of a custom official's unique job responsibilities).
22 See Vernonia, 115 S.Ct. at 2396; Schaill v. Tippecanoe County Sch. Corp., 864
F.2d 1309, 1324 (7th Cir. 1988). But see Brooks v. East Chambers Consol. Indep. Sch.
Dist., 730 F. Supp 759, 766 (S.D. Tex. 1989) (expressing that urinalysis testing for
drugs was unconstitutional without individualized suspicion); University of Colo. v.
Derdeyn, 863 P.2d 929, 935 (Colo. 1993) (maintaining that the University's random
drug testing program conducted on student athletes was unconstitutional under the
Fourth Amendment).
The Supreme Court has held that the collection of urine constitutes a search
under the Fourth Amendment. See Skinner, 489 U.S. at 617. Moreover, the Von Raab
Court acknowledged:
There are few activities in our society more personal or private than the
passing of urine. Most people describe it by euphemisms if they talk
about it at all. It is a function traditionally performed without public
observation; indeed its performance in public is generally prohibited by
law as well as social customs.
Id.; Loworn v. City of Chattanooga, 846 F.2d 1539, 1542 (6th Cir. 1988); Everett v.
Napper, 833 F.2d 1507, 1511 (11th Cir. 1987).
23 See Vernonia, 115 S. Ct. at 2395. Moreover, circuit courts have even upheld student strip searches. See Cornfield v. Consolidated High Sch., 991 F.2d 1316, 1322
(1993) (strip search of male student suspected of "crotching" drugs was reasonable
under Fourth Amendment); Williams v. Ellington, 936 F.2d 881, 883 (6th Cir. 1991)
(upholding search requesting a female, who was suspected of drug possession, to remove her T-shirt and drop herjeans to her knees). But see Tarter v. Raybuck, 742 F.2d
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Court has unabashedly pushed aside individual rights by allowing
warrantless and suspicionless searches through random drug testing of student athletes.2 4
In the recent decision of Vernonia School District v. Acton,2 5 the
United States Supreme Court reviewed the validity of a student's
claim that the Student Athletic Drug Policy (the Policy),26 which
required random drug testing for all student athletes, violated the
977, 983 (7th Cir. 1984) (noting that a strip search was never justifiable because a
student's privacy interest would outweigh the school's interest in discipline).
24 See generally Phyllis T. Bookspan, Reworking the Warrant Requirement: Resuscitating
the FourthAmendment, 44 VAND. L. REv. 473, 513, 515 (1991) (arguing that warrantless
searches are presumptively unreasonable due to current technology that allows the
expeditious obtainment of warrants); Harold J. Krent, Of Diaries and DataBanks: Use
Restrictions Under the Fourth Amendment, 74 TEX. L. REv 49, 49 (1995) (proffering that
the Supreme Court has severely diminished Fourth Amendment protection of individual privacy rights); Tracey Maclin, The Central Meaning of the Fourth Amendment, 35
WM. & MARv L. REv. 197, 201 (1993) (suggesting that the Supreme Court has bypassed the purpose of the Fourth Amendment, which is to protect the public from
the unfettered discretion of the government); Serr, supra note 8, at 584 (articulating
that the Court has begun to tip the balance in favor of the government as opposed to
the individual); Shannon B. Blair, Comment, Testing the Fourth Amendment: Random,
Suspicionless UrinalysisDrug-Testing of Student-Athletes is [an] UnconstitutionalSearch, 28
SUFFOLK U.L. REv. 217, 226 (1994) (explaining that there is a struggle to balance the
state's interest in the welfare of students against the individual's Fourth Amendment
rights); Robert C. Farley, Jr., Suspicionless, Random Urinalysis: The UnreasonableSearch of
the Student Athlete, 68 TEMP. L. REv. 439, 459 (1995) (advocating that the Court should
not sacrifice students' privacy rights in an attempt to alleviate society's drug problem);
John A. Hamilton, Note, The United States Supreme Court's Erosion of Fourth Amendment
Rights: The Trend Continues, 30 S.D. L. REv. 574, 574 (1985) (stating that the Court has
abraded individual rights under the Fourth Amendment); Leading Cases, Drug Testing-Student Athletes, 109 HARv. L. REv. 220, 229 (1995) [hereinafter Student Athletes]
(arguing that the Supreme Court has a right to protect our children's constitutional
rights under the Fourth Amendment).
25 115 S. Ct. 2386 (1995).
26 See Vernonia Sch. Dist. v. Acton, 23 F.3d 1514, 1516 (9th Cir. 1994). The school
board adopted the policy in 1989. See id. The school required any student who
wished to participate in athletics to sign a form agreeing to a random urinalysis drug
test on a weekly basis. See id. The school suspended from the athletic season any
student who refused to sign the form or take the drug test. See id. at 1517.
Girls who were chosen for the drug test went to the director of the girls' athletics
office to produce the urine specimen and boys went to the locker room. See id. at
1516-17. While boys produced a specimen, a faculty monitor was seated approximately 12 feet away listening for typical sounds of urination. See id. at 1517. The
school sent urine samples to a lab that tested for the following: LSD, cocaine, marijuana, amphetamines, and creatinine. See id. The lab then reported results of the test
to district personnel and positive tests were mailed to the district superintendent. See
id.
Upon receiving a positive test; the student was required to take a second test. See
id. If the student received two positive tests, parents were notified and the student
had to either: (1) elect to attend drug counseling for six weeks including weekly drug
tests, or (2) take suspension from athletics for the remainder of the current year and
following year. See id. The second offense entailed an automatic suspension for the

236

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 27:230

Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. 2 7 The Court concluded that
due to the diminished expectation of privacy by student athletes,
the limited nature of the search, and the compelling state interest
at stake, the school district did not overstep its constitutional au28
thority by implementing the Policy.
When James Acton, a seventh-grade student, and his parents
declined to sign a drug testing consent form, the school declared
Acton ineligible to play football.2 9 In addition to their Federal
Constitutional claims, the Actons sought declaratory and injunctive
relief from the Policy on the grounds that it violated Article I, Section 930 of the Oregon Constitution.3" In denying Acton's claim,
the district court held that in the context of the Fourth Amendment, Acton's privacy interest was less important than the compel32
ling need of Oregon to maintain order and protect students.
On appeal, the Actons claimed that random drug testing was
not justifiable because it was not proven in the district court that a
severe drug problem existed in the Vernonia school system.3 3 The
Ninth Circuit found that there was a drug problem in the Vernonia
school system; however, it held that the Policy violated the Fourth
34
Amendment and Article I, Section 9 of the Oregon Constitution.
current athletic season and next year's athletic term. See id. The third offense demanded suspension for the current athletic period and the next two seasons. See id.
27 See Vernonia, 115 S. Ct, at 2390.
28 See id. at 2396.
29 See id. at 2390.
30 See OR. CONST. art. I, § 9. The Oregon Constitution, Article I, § 9 states:
No law shall violate the right of the people to be secure in their persons,
house, papers, and effects, against unreasonable search, or seizure; and
no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, supported by oath, or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and
the persons or thing to be seized.
Id.
31 See Veronia, 115 S. Ct. at 2390.
32 See Acton v. Vernonia Sch. Dist., 796 F. Supp. 1354, 1368 (D. Or. 1992). The
district court examined the following issues often used by Oregon courts when analyzing such circumstances: (1), did an important state interest exist; (2), the level of
intrusiveness caused by the procedure; (3), efficiency of the method used to reach the
designating goal; and (4), the amount of discretion afforded to school officials. See id.
at 1367-68.
33 See Acton v. Vernonia Sch. Dist., 23 F.3d 1514, 1519 (9th Cir. 1994).
34 See id. at 1519, 1527. The court of appeals noted that language in Article I, § 9
of the Oregon Constitution was nearly the same as the Fourth Amendment. See id. at
1519. Because the constitutional provision would not likely offer less protection, the
court determined that it would apply the Fourth Amendment to decide the case. See
id. at 1518, 1519. Moreover, the court disagreed with Acton's claim that a drug problem did not exist and found that drug use appeared to be on the rise. See id. at 1519.
In deciding the constitutional basis of the allegation, the court asked: (1) was
there a search; (2) was there authority to conduct the search; and (3) was the search
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The court reversed and remanded the case because the government's interest in curtailing drug abuse was not compelling
enough to outweigh the student athletes' Fourth Amendment
35
rights.
Due to the significance of the issue involved, the Supreme
Court of the United States granted certiorari to decide whether the
Policy enacted by the school district transgressed the Constitution.3' Relying on several past cases that confronted the issue of
Fourth Amendment warrantless and suspicionless search and
seizure issues,3 7 the Court held that the Policy was constitutional.3 8
Subsequently, the Court remanded the case to the court of appeals
for further proceedings.3 9
The Supreme Court has considered warrantless and suspicionless search and seizure cases on several occasions.4 In Camara
v. Municipal Court,4" the Court departed from the normal strictures
of the warrant and probable cause requirements by employing the
reasonableness standard under the Fourth Amendment and for
the first time upheld suspicionless searches.4 2 In Camara,the plainjustifiable? See id. First, the court explained that collection of urine constituted a
search. See id. at 1520. Second, the court enunciated that there was authority to conduct the search because the Policy was "properly authorized" when the Board
adopted it. See id. at 1521. Third, the court found, however, that the procedure was
unreasonable because the government interest was not compelling enough to allow
suspicionless searches. See id. at 1526.
35 See id. at 1526, 1527. Although the court agreed that the goal of drug-free athletes was laudable, the court explained that students' constitutional liberties were at
stake. See id. at 1527. The court criticized the Seventh Circuit decision in Schaill v.
Tippecanoe for minimizing the privacy liberties of student athletes by allowing random
drug testing. See id. (citing Schaill v. Tippecanoe County Sch. Corp., 864 F.2d 1309
(7th Cir. 1988)). Moreover, the court asserted that living with displeasure and even
danger in order to sustain constitutional safeguards was necessary. See id.
36 Vernonia, 115 S. Ct. at 2388.
37 See id. at 2390-91 (citing Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602
(1989); National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989); New
Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985)).
38 See Vernonia, 115 S. Ct. at 2396. The Court emphasized that random drug testing would not be constitutional in all settings. See id. Moreover, Justice Scalia reiterated that the most persuasive factor was "that the Policy was undertaken in
furtherance of the government's responsibilities, under a public school system, as
guardian and tutor of children entrusted to its care." Id. In addition, the majority
explained that because the Fourth Amendment was not violated, neither was Article I,
§ 9 of the Oregon Constitution. See id. at 2397.
39 See id.
40 See Skinner, 489 U.S. at 602; Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 656; T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 325.
41 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
42 See id. at 534, 538. Justice White contended that "'probable cause' to issue a
warrant to inspect must exist if reasonable legislative or administrative standards for
conducting an area inspection are satisfied with respect to a particular dwelling." Id.
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tiff refused to allow a housing inspector into his dwelling without a
warrant and was subsequently arrested for violating a municipal
code.4" Although the Court agreed that administrative searches
were significant intrusions that must be accompanied by a warrant,
the Court determined that probable cause would be assumed if a
reasonable government interest existed.44 Justice White emphasized that the reasonableness requirement determined the validity
of the government interest, which gave rise to blanket probable
cause. 45 Subsequently, the Court balanced California's need for
the search against the plaintiff's privacy interest and found that because the search was reasonable, probable cause was inferred
under the Fourth Amendment.46
The Supreme Court again recognized an expansion in state
government authority by applying the reasonableness standard of
the Fourth Amendment in United States v. Martinez-Fuerte,47 where
the Court held that police-administered checkpoint stops need not
be accompanied by a warrant or probable cause.48 In Martinez-Fuerte, the police stopped the defendant at a permanent checkpoint
at 538; see also Hagge, supra note 8, at n.4 (recognizing that Camarawas the first case
to uphold suspicionless searches).
43 See Camara, 387 U.S. at 525, 527. The inspector returned at a later date, again
without a warrant, and the plaintiff refused to let him inside. See id. at 526. The
plaintiff received a citation to appear in the district attorney's office, which he ignored. See id. Thereafter, the inspector filed a complaint against the plaintiff for
refusing to allow a lawful examination of his premises, which eventually led to his
arrest. See id. at 527.
44 See id. at 534, 538. Justice White determined that administrative searches were
serious infringements upon the interests preserved by the Fourth Amendment and
without a warrant, traditional safeguards would be extinguished. See id. at 534. Further, the Court explained that the inspectors could maintain their goals within the
prescribed search warrant requirements. See id. at 533. Finally, the Justice concluded
that if the inspection conducted by the state was reasonable, probable cause existed
and the Court would provide a search warrant. See id. at 539.
45 See id. Justice White articulated that the test for reasonableness was the balance
between the need for the search against the invasion of an individual's privacy. See id.
at 536-37.
46 See id. at 538. First, Justice White highlighted that the public and the judiciary
had long embraced inspection programs. See id. at 537. Second, the Court stated that
inspections were the only means of preventing dangerous violations of building
codes. See id. Third, Justice White opined that a limited invasion of privacy was involved because the inspections were not criminal or personal. See id.
47 428 U.S. 543 (1976).
48 See id. at 545. Justice Powell explained that the point agent visually screened the
vehicles as they passed through the checkpoint. See id. at 546. In a small number of
cases, the Justice stated, the point agent directed cars to a secondary inspection zone
where the motorist and passengers were asked about their immigration status. See id.
Moreover, the Court asserted that the average inquiry at the second stop lasted between three and five minutes. See id. at 546-47.
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operated by the border patrol, where he was subsequently arrested
for smuggling illegal Mexican aliens across the border.49 Relying
upon the reasonableness test proffered in Camara, the Court balanced the individual's interests against California's and concluded
that the checkpoint was constitutional.5" Justice Powell reasoned
that California's checkpoint stations, which the government defined as a critical traffic-checking operation, were necessary to control the influx of illegal aliens.5 1 The Court also articulated that
while the need for checkpoints was crucial to the State, the intrusion upon motorists' Fourth Amendment rights was minor.5 2 Accordingly, the Court held that the checkpoint stop could be made
without satisfying the warrant or individualized suspicion
53
requirement.
49 See id. at 547. Martinez-Fuerte was a legal resident of the United States but his
passengers were illegal aliens. See id. at 547-48. The defendant moved to suppress the
evidence obtained by the border patrol on the grounds that the checkpoint violated
his Fourth Amendment rights. See id. at 548.
50 See id. at 560-62. At the outset, Justice Powell submitted that individualized suspicion was ordinarily essential to a valid search or seizure. See id. at 560. The Court
contended, however, that suspicion was not an irreducible requirement under the
Constitution. See id. at 561. Relying on the Camara Court's reasonableness test, the
Justice concluded that California's concern to stop illegal aliens from entering the
country outweighed the interests of the individual. See id. Justice Powell stated that
one's expectation of privacy in an automobile was less than the level of privacy an
individual would anticipate in a residence. See id.; United States v. Ortiz, 442 U.S. 891,
896 n.2 (1975); Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 590 (1974); Almeida-Sanchez v.
United States, 413 U.S. 266, 279 (1973) (Powell,J., concurring). Moreover, the Court
conceded that intrusion on the motorist was minimal and the interest of the State was
legitimate. See Martinez-Fuerte,428 U.S. at 562. Accordingly, Justice Powell found that
the checkpoint stops were valid absent individualized suspicion. See id.
51 See Martinez-Fuerte.428 U.S. at 556.
52 See id. at 557-58. The Court reasoned that the checkpoint stop did limit the
motorists right to "'free passage without interruption.'" See id. at 557-58 (quoting
Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 154 (1925)). Justice Powell explained, however, that the visual inspection was confined to what the border patrol could see and
neither the vehicle nor the motorists were searched. See id. at 558. Furthermore, the
Court compared routine checkpoints to those found on random highway stops and
articulated the following: (1) interference with average traffic was minor, and (2)
checkpoint stops involved less discretionary activity on the part of the police officers.
See id. at 559. The Court also pointed out that the checkpoint stops were neither
intimidating nor frightening as compared to random individual stops by police officers. See id. at 558 (quoting Ortiz, 422 U.S. at 894-95).
53 See id. at 562. The Court emphasized that the holding was limited to the type of
stop illustrated in this case and that normally consent or probable cause was necessary
to conduct a checkpoint search. See id. at 567.
The Supreme Court has also decided cases involving random police and sobriety
checkpoint stops under the Fourth Amendment. See Michigan Dep't of State Police v.
Sitz, 469 U.S. 444, 455 (1990); Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663 (1979). In Delaware v. Prouse, the Court constricted the government's power by holding that reasonable suspicion must be present before a patrol officer could randomly stop a vehicle.
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In New Jersey v. T.L.O.,54 the Supreme Court held that warrant
and probable cause stipulations did not apply and that a reasonableness test under the Fourth Amendment should be employed in
the school setting.5 5 Because individualized suspicion was present
See 440 U.S. at 663. The Prouse Court considered whether it was reasonable under the
Fourth Amendment to pull over automobiles without suspicion. See id.at 650. Balancing the intrusion of the motorists' interests against those of the state, Justice White
held that the law enforcement practice was not justifiable in light of Fourth Amendment guarantees. See id. at 659-61. Justice White espoused that random stops did not
significantly contribute to roadway safety and that alternative mechanisms existed. See
id.at 659-63. Therefore, the Court held that police officers could not interfere with
motorists on public highways without reasonable suspicion. See id.at 663. See, e.g.,
United States v. Montgomery, 561 F.2d 875, 877 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (explaining that
because the stop of the vehicle was not based on suspicion, evidence must be suppressed); Commonwealth v. Swanger, 307 A.2d 875, 879 (Pa. 1973) (articulating that
the officer must have probable cause to stop a vehicle before pulling a driver over to
determine if the vehicle complies with state statutes). But see United States v. Jenkins,
528 F.2d 713, 714 (10th Cir. 1975) (holding that patrolman's stop for routine registration papers was constitutional absent suspicion); Leonard v. State, 496 S.W.2d 576,
577 (Tex. Ct. App. 1973) (finding that the police may constitutionally stop a vehicle
without suspicion to determine the validity of a driver's license).
In Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, however, the Court afforded the government broad authority to conduct routine checkpoints without meeting the warrant or
probable cause requirements of the Fourth Amendment. See 496 U.S. 444, 447
(1990). In Sitz, the Court granted certiorari to decide whether sobriety checkpoints
were constitutional. See id. at 448, 450. Reiterating the Fourth Amendment's reasonableness test, Justice Rehnquist asserted that a motorist's right must be balanced
against the government's interest in preventing drunk driving. See id. at 455. The
Court opined that as in Martinez-Fuerte, the intrusion on the individual's Fourth
Amendment rights were slight. See id. at 451-52. Moreover, Justice Rehnquist distinguished Prouseby reasoning that the police in Prouse randomly pulled over motorists,
while the Michigan Police in the instant matter had routine sobriety checkpoints that
stopped every vehicle. See id. at 453, 454. Therefore, the Court held that Michigan's
interest in protecting the general public from drunk drivers outweighed the intrusion
upon the individual motorists who were stopped at the sobriety checkpoints. See id. at
455.
54 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
55 See id. at 340-41. The Court for the first time promulgated that school officials
were representatives of the state and were not immune from the Fourth Amendment.
See id. at 336. See, e.g., Tarter v. Raybuck, 742 F.2d 977, 981 (6th Cir. 1984) (explaining that public school officials were agents of the state); Horton v. Goose Creek Indep. Sch. Dist., 690 F.2d 470, 480 (5th Cir. 1982) (articulating that school authorities
paid by the state are constrained under the Fourth Amendment); Bellinier v. Lund,
438 F. Supp. 47, 52 (N.D.N.Y. 1977) (reasoning that the regulation of public school
teachers by the state constituted state action). But see D.RC. v. State, 646 P.2d 252,
256 (Alaska Ct. App. 1982) (finding that school officials were not agents of the government and not governed by state or federal constitutional constraints); State v. Baccino, 282 A.2d 869, 871 (Del. Super. Ct. 1971) (determining that school teachers act
in loco parentis of the students); State v. D.T.W., 425 So. 2d 1383, 1386 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1983) (advocating that school officials' loco parentis status broadens their authority and decreases students' expectation of privacy); R.C.M. v. State, 660 S.W.2d 552,
553-54 (Tex. App. 1983) (holding that the vice principal and school security guard
were not governmental actors). First, the Court proclaimed that the Fourth Amend-
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in T.L.O., the Court left open the question of whether such suspicion was required under the reasonableness standard.5 6 In T.L. 0.,
a student claimed that a school administrator's search of her purse
for cigarettes violated her Fourth Amendment rights.5 7 Stressing
the existence of "special needs" for discipline in the school setting,
the majority questioned: (1) whether there was a reasonable belief
that the search would prove the student violated school policy or
the law, and (2) whether the search was reasonably related to the
circumstances that caused the initial interference. 5 8 Applying this
ment's unreasonable search and seizure prohibition had never been limited to conduct of police but, rather, to government action. See T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 335. Second,
the Court posited that school officials were more than surrogates for parents; they
were representatives of the state. See id. at 336. Finally, the Court recounted, "if
school authorities are state actors for purposes of the constitutional guarantees of
freedom of expression and due process, it is difficult to understand why they should
be deemed to be exercising parental rather than public authority when conducting
searches of their students." Id.
56 See id. at 342 n.8.
57 See id. at 328-29. A teacher found T.L.O. and another student smoking in the
lavatory and escorted them to the principal's office. See id. at 328. T.L.O. met with
the assistant vice principal and denied that she had been smoking in the lavatory. See
id. The assistant vice principal asked to see her purse and found cigarettes and rolling papers. See id. The vice principal proceeded to search for marijuana and found a
small amount of marijuana in T.L.O.'s purse, along with a pipe, plastic bags, a significant amount of money, and a list of people who owed T.L.O. money. See id. The
assistant vice principal gave the police all of the confiscated materials found in
T.L.O.'s purse. See id. The police brought T.L.O. to the police station where she
confessed to selling marijuana at the school. See id. at 329.
The State charged T.L.O. with delinquency in juvenile court. See id. Thejuvenile
court found for the State and held that the search was reasonable. See id. The New
Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division, affirmed, inter alia, the juvenile court's
holding that the search was reasonable and did not violate T.L.O.'s Fourth Amendment rights. See id. at 330. The New Jersey Supreme Court, however, reversed the
appellate division and found that the search of T.L.O.'s purse was unreasonable. See
id. The court agreed that a warrantless search would not violate the Fourth Amendment if a school official had reasonable grounds to suspect illegal activity or if a student interfered with school discipline. See id. at 330-31. The majority determined,
however, that the search of T.L.O.'s purse was not reasonable because possession of
cigarettes was neither illegal nor violated school rules. See id. at 331. Moreover, the
court concluded that the evidence of drug use found by the assistant vice principal
did not justify the extensive search of T.L.O.'s bag. See id.
58 See id. at 341-42. The Court declared that the initial search of T.L.O.'s purse was
valid because the school administrator had reasonable suspicion to believe that
T.L.O. had been smoking against school policy. See id. at 345-46. Moreover, the Justice stated, "[tihe relevance of T.L.O.'s possession of cigarettes to the question
whether she had been smoking and to the credibility of her denial that she smoked
supplied the necessary 'nexus' between the item searched for and the infraction
under investigation." Id. at 345 (citing Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 307 (1967)).
Furthermore,Justice White asserted that the discovery of rolling papers indicated that
T.L.O. may have had marijuana in her bag, which justified continued exploration. See
id. at 347.
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test, the Court found the initial search for cigarettes reasonable
because a teacher had reported that T.L.O. was smoking in the
school lavatory against school policy.5 9 The Court further determined that the continued search, which ultimately yielded marijuana, was reasonably related to a finding of rolling papers in
T.L.O.'s purse.6 ° Accordingly, Justice White balanced the individual's interest of privacy against the school's need to maintain order
and ruled that the search passed the reasonableness test of the
Fourth Amendment. 61
Two years later, in Schaill v. Tippecanoe School Corp.,6 2 the
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit first addressed the issue of school-conducted, random, warrantless, and
suspicionless drug-urinalysis searches under the Fourth Amendment.6' Relying on the Supreme Court's decision in T.L.O., the
court reasoned that neither a warrant nor probable cause was necessary under the Fourth Amendment and applied a reasonableness
standard to the school setting.' Employing the balancing test, the
court emphasized the following: (1) suspicionless searches were
often permitted when there was a decreased privacy interest such
as in the case of an athlete;6 5 (2) urinalysis testing was the least
intrusive manner of serving the government's end of drug-free students; 66 and (3) because the search was not for criminal purposes,
See id. at 345-46.
See id. at 347. Moreover, the Court observed that further exploration of T.L.O.'s
purse turned up a pipe, a small amount of marijuana, and litle bags that were normally used to store marijuana. See id. In addition, Justice White found that it was not
unreasonable for the assistant vice principal to unzipper the pockets of T.L.O.'s purse
in an attempt to uncover more evidence of wrongdoing. See id. In sum, the Court
concluded the search for cigarettes and marijuana in T.L.O.'s purse was not unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. See id.
61 See id. at 347-48.
62 864 F.2d 1309 (7th Cir. 1988).
63 See id. at 1310. Tippecanoe County School (TCS) operates two high schools
located in Indiana. See id. Due to rumors of drug abuse among athletes, a coach
insisted that 16 members of the baseball team submit to a urinalysis test. See id. Five
of the students tested positive for marijuana. See id. In response, TCS instituted a
mandatory urinalysis drug testing program for all athletes and cheerleaders. See id.
64 See id. at 1315.
65 See id. at 1317. First, the court reasoned that there was a diminished expectation
of privacy for athletes because of the tradition of communal undress and physical
examinations. See id. at 1318. Second, the court stated that there were other requirements expected of the athletes such as minimum grade point average and residency.
See id. Third, due to the highly publicized drug testing initiative of professional athletes, the court posited that student athletes were aware of the routine nature of
urinalysis testing. See id. at 1319.
66 See id. at 1322. The Seventh Circuit reasoned that warrantless and suspicionless
searches may be justified when unlawful conditions cannot be surmised by other
59
60
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it was likely to adhere to the reasonableness standard.6 7 Accordingly, the court held that because the interest of the school was
greater than the athletes' individual privacy expectations, the
urinalysis tests were constitutional.6 8
Foreshadowing the Supreme Court's resolution of random
drug testing in the school setting, the Court in Skinner v. Railway
LaborExecutives' Ass'n,69 declared that the Federal Railroad Administration's (FRA) regulations, which required railway workers to
submit to mandatory drug and alcohol testing, were constitutional.7" The FRA advanced regulations under the Federal Railroad Safety Act of 197071 in response to evidence indicating that
drug use by employees was a contributing factor in many major
accidents. 72 The Court noted that a reasonableness standard apmethods. See id. at 1318. The court noted, however, that government representatives
must not abuse warrantless searches and their discretion must be confined. See id.
For example, the court stated that there must be objective criteria why a student was
singled out for the search. See id.
67 See SchaiU, 864 F.2d at 1322. The judge stated that many times a warrantless and
suspicionless search may be valid for civil purposes but not for criminal purposes. See
id.
68 See id. The court found the following: students voluntarily choose to participate
in athletics; athletes have a lesser expectation of privacy; the school had a substantial
interest in curtailing drugs in athletics; the urinalysis program was the least intrusive
means of collecting information; discretion of school officials was limited because the
search was random; and information was not used for a criminal purpose. See id.
69
70

489 U.S. 602 (1989).

See id. at 634. The Railway Labor Executives' Association first brought suit in the
Northern District of California in an effort to prohibit the Federal Railroad Administration's (FRA) mandatory drug testing initiative. See id. at 612. The district court
held in favor of the FRA and reasoned that although the railway workers had valid
Fourth Amendment rights at stake, the compelling interest of the state to secure
safety needs for the public surpassed any statutory and constitutional arguments. See
id. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court and held
that particularized suspicion was necessary in order to drug test the railway employees. See id. at 612-13. The Ninth Circuit asserted that the suspicion requirement
would make the test reasonable within the Fourth Amendment without imposing an
undue burden on the FRA. See id. at 613.
71 See 45 U.S.C. § 431 (1983).
72 See Skinner, 489 U.S. at 606. In 1985, the FRA announced regulations regarding
drug and alcohol testing of railway employees. See id. at 608. The FRA concluded that
21 major train accidents involved alcohol or drug abuse as the probable cause. See id.
at 607. Moreover, the FRA reported that accidents resulted in 25 deaths, property
damage of $19 million, and over 60 non-fatal injuries. See id. In response, the FRA
prohibited railway employees from utilizing or possessing alcohol or any illegal substance under the 1987 Code of Federal Regulations. See id. at 608. Two parts of the
regulation also addressed drug testing. See id. at 609. The regulations mandated toxicological testing if a railway employee was involved in a major train accident. See id.
Under the regulations, a major train accident is defined as one which involves: "(i) a
fatality, (ii) the release of hazardous material accompanied by an evacuation or a
reportable injury, or (iii) damage to railroad property of $500,000 or more." 49
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plied because both the warrant and probable cause requirements
frustrated the government's purpose.7 3 Conducting the reasonableness test of the Fourth Amendment, the Skinner Court determined that the public's need for safety outweighed the employees'
privacy interests, which were diminished due to the nature of the
highly regulated industry and the performance of life or death
tasks.7 4 Justice Kennedy therefore held that the FRA's regulations
served a compelling government interest in providing safety and
75
were reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.

C.F.R. § 219.201 (a) (1) (1995). Moreover, all employees involved in an accident are
to be transported to a hospital where blood and urine specimens are taken. See Skinner, 489 U.S. at 609. The Regulations also authorized the FRA to demand employees
to submit to breath or urine tests: (1) "after a reportable accident or incident, where a
supervisor has a reasonable suspicion that an employee's acts or omissions contributed to the occurrence or severity of the accident or incident, § 219.301(b) (2); or (2)
in the event of certain specific rule violations, including noncompliance with a signal
and excessive speeding, § 219.301(b) (3)." 49 C.F.R. § 219.301(b) (1995). Also, if two
railroad managers suspect impairment due to alcohol or drugs, an employee may be
required to submit to breath or urine tests. See 49 C.F.R. § 219.301(c)(2)(i) (1995).
73 See Skinner, 489 U.S. at 624. As an initial matter, the Skinner Court expressed
that (1) even though the railroad was a private entity, the searches under the FRA's
new regulations were for the purpose of public safety needs and therefore were government action, and (2) breath and urine tests constituted a search under the Fourth
Amendment. See id. at 614, 616, 617. Next, the Court declared that the reasonableness test was applicable due to the "special needs" of law enforcement to guarantee
the public's safety. See id. at 520. Justice Kennedy contended that the imposition of a
warrant requirement would frustrate the government's objective in maintaining alcohol and drug-free railway employees. See id. at 624. Requiring supervisors to become
familiar with the details of the Fourth Amendment, Justice Kennedy posited, would be
unreasonable and stifle the objectives of drug testing. See id. at 623-24. Similarly, the
probable cause requirement, the Court asserted, would also provide an imposition on
law enforcement. See id. at 624. For example, the Justice stated that an employee
under the influence of drugs or alcohol infrequently displayed signs that a layperson
or even medical doctor could detect. See id. at 628. Therefore, the Court found that
individualized suspicion would be an unrealistic endeavor under the circumstances.
See id. at 631.
74 See id. at 633-34. First,Justice Kennedy stressed that the breath test permitted by
the regulations did not significantly impinge on an individual privacy's interest. See
id. at 626. Due to both the ability to conduct the breath test outside of a hospital
setting and the limited information ascertained, the Justice determined that the intrusion was minimal. See id. at 625-26. Second, the Court concluded that urine testing
was reasonable due to the diminished expectation of privacy in the highly regulated
railroad industry. See id. at 627-28. Justice Kennedy, citing to the regulations,. noted
that railroads mandated physical examinations for certain employees. See id. at 627.
75 See id. at 634. Because of the possible critical consequences arising from druginduced train operators, the Court found that a compelling government interest existed. See id. at 628. Justice Kennedy explained that an idle locomotive becomes
deadly when carelessly operated by drug or alcohol induced employees. See id. Moreover, the Justice asserted that a momentary lapse in judgment by a train operator
could lead to a catastrophe. See id. Therefore, the Court held that the FRA's regula-
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Similarly, in National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab,7 6
the Court held that drug testing of custom officials without a warrant or probable cause was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. 7 In Von Raab, the United States Customs Service enacted a
program requiring employees who transferred into jobs that entailed drug interdiction or required the use of firearms to undergo
a drug-urinalysis test.78 The Court justified departure from the ordinary warrant and probable cause requirements by emphasizing
that when the search or seizure involved a governmental "special
need," a court should balance the government's interest against
the individual's expectation of privacy.7 9 Justice Kennedy asserted
tions were reasonable and constitutional under the Fourth Amendment.
634.
76 489 U.S. 656 (1989).

See id. at

77 See id. at 677. The Petitioners, union employees, initiated suit in the Eastern
District of Louisiana alleging that drug testing violated Fourth Amendment privacy
rights. See id. at 663. The district court held that the drug testing violated the employees' Fourth Amendment rights because there was no probable cause or suspicion required. See id. Therefore, the court enjoined the Custom Service's drug testing
program. See id. A divided Fifth Circuit reversed the district court's holding that the
mandatory drug tests were constitutional under the Fourth Amendment. See id. at
663-64. The Fifth Circuit ruled that the drug testing procedures involved minimal
intrusiveness and emphasized that the government had a grave interest in the morality of the custom's officials for purposes of national security. See id.
78 See id. at 659, 660-61. The Court observed that the Commissioner of Customs
established that drug urinalysis tests were reliable and should be employed on custom
officials involved with drug interdiction or firearms. See id. at 660. The Justice further
noted that drug testing was made a prerequisite for employment positions if one or
more of the following criteria applied: (1) candidate involved with drug enforcement;
(2) candidate required to carry firearms; (3) candidate worked with classified material. See id. at 660-61. The Court explained the test was conducted once the employee
was selected for a position that met one of the three criteria, and final employment
was contingent upon a successful completion of a drug test. See id. at 661. TheJustice
articulated that to ensure against a substitution or alteration of the urine sample, a
same sex person stood close by while the potential employee provided the urine sample. See id. Justice Kennedy stated that the lab disclosed positive results to a Medical
Review Officer who verified and passed on the results to the agency. See id. at 662-63.
If the employee failed to offer a valid reason for the positive results, the Court explained that the employee's job was subject to termination. See id. at 663. The Justice
emphasized, however, that disclosure to criminal agencies was not possible without
the employee's consent. See id.
79 See id. at 665-66. The Justice recognized that a warrant requirement would divert the Custom Service's energy from the laudable goal of drug-free employees. See
id. at 666-67. Justice Kennedy also noted that a warrant would not provide any more
protection because under the current structure, an employee was not subject to the
unfettered discretion of an official. See id. at 667. Instead, the Justice asserted that
the intrusion was limited and that custom employees were constantly on notice of the
drug-testing requirement. See id. Likewise, the Court concluded that probable cause
was not necessary because that standard was normally required for criminal investigations. See id. Moreover, the Justice averred that the government's need to carry out
suspicionless searches outweighed the custom employees' privacy interests. See id. at
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that the Customs Service had a compelling interest not to promote
drug users to positions that entailed drug interdiction or the use of
firearms because the lives of citizens were at risk.80 Moreover, the
Justice reasoned that employees in these fields have a diminished
expectation of privacy due to their duties, which required good
judgment and agility.8 1 Therefore, the Court held that employee
drug testing met the reasonableness standard and was constitutional under the Fourth Amendment.8 2

Amid this foundation of precedent that afforded numerous interpretations of the Fourth Amendment's protection, the United
States Supreme Court decided Vernonia School District v. Acton."
Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, questioned the constitutionality of the Policy, which permitted random urinalysis drug testing
of student athletes.8 4 Finding in favor of the school district, the
Court held the Policy constitutional under the Fourth
Amendment. 5
Justice Scalia began by emphasizing that the drug problem in

the Vernonia school district had reached epidemic proportions.8 6
668. Hence, Justice Kennedy declared that the reasonableness test under the Fourth
Amendment applied. See id. at 665-66.
80 See id. at 671. Justice Kennedy pronounced that the first line of defense in the
prevention of smuggling narcotics was the Customs Service. See id. at 668. The Court
explained that a drug-user's indifference or complicity to illegal activities at the border could irreparably harm the public. See id. at 670.
81 See Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 672. Justice Kennedy stated that the custom employees involved in drug interdiction should reasonably expect an inquiry into their wellness and integrity. See id. Similarly, the Justice concluded that the same reasoning
was true for custom officials who carried firearms. See id. Because successful performance of their duties hinged on deftness, the Court agreed that the Custom Service
should have access to facts that bear on the employees' suitability. See id.
82 See id. at 679. The Justice noted that the Court did not decide the reasonableness of the drug testing program towards employees who handled classified information. See id. Justice Kennedy insisted that it was unclear which employees fell under
the classified information category: employees who had confidential information or
employees who had access to confidential information. See id. at 678. Therefore, the
Justice remanded the case to the appellate court for clarification and assessment
under the reasonableness standard. See id. at 679.
83 115 S. Ct. 2386 (1995). ChiefJustice Rehnquist and Justices Kennedy, Thomas,
Ginsburg, and Breyer joined Justice Scalia in the majority. See id. at 2388.
84 See id.
85 See id. at 2396.
86 See id. at 2388-89. Justice Scalia explained that the school faculty noticed an
increase in drug use in the Vernonia schools in the mid-to-late 1980s. See id. at 2388.
The students taunted school officials, the Court stated, by promoting the use of drugs
and threatening that the schools had no control over the situation. See id. In the late
1980s, the number of disciplinary cases nearly doubled in the Vernonia schools when
compared to the early 1980s. See id. Moreover, the Justice articulated that student
athletes seemed to be the leaders of the drug phenomenon. See id. at 2388-89. The
school district became concerned, the majority stated, because one of the coaches
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The Court then examined the testing procedures 87 of the students
and determined that the collection of urine constituted a search
under the Fourth Amendment.8 8 Moreover, the Court stressed
that a warrantless and suspicionless search may be constitutional
when "special needs" make such requirements impractical. 89 Because the public school setting had "special needs," the Court employed the reasonableness standard and balanced the
government's intrusion against the individual's privacy
expectations. 90
In applying the reasonableness test, Justice Scalia initially considered the nature of the intrusion set forth by the search. 9' Upon
evaluating the infringement, the Court emphasized that the Policy
92
applied to children committed to the state for temporary custody.
Justice Scalia articulated that school officials served a custodial role
believed that football players and wrestlers were involved in sports-related injuries due
to poor judgment caused by drug use. See id. at 2389. Justice Scalia explained initially
that the schools fought back by providing classes and lectures to deter drug use by the
students, but disciplinary problems continued to rise. See id. Subsequently, the
school district held a parents' night and discussed the mandatory drug testing initiative, which the Court asserted was unanimously approved. See id. Ultimately, the
Vernonia schools implemented the Policy, which was meant to deter drug use, prevent sport injuries, and provide support programs to students with drug problems. See
id.
87 See id. at 2389-90; supra note 26.
88 See Vernonia, 115 S. Ct. at 2390; Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489
U.S. 602, 617 (1989); National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656,
665 (1989).
89 See Vernonia, 115 S. Ct. at 2391; New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 351 (1985)
(Blackmun, J., concurring).
90 See Vernonia, 115 S. Ct. at 2391. The majority explained that a warrant was normally required if used for criminal purposes. See id. at 2390. Moreover, the Court
stressed that a warrant could not be issued without probable cause. See id. at 2391.
The Justice explained that when "special needs" are present, as in the public school
arena, a warrant was not required. See id. Therefore,Justice Scalia determined that a
reasonableness standard should be used in cases where no clear standard to determine the type of search existed. See id. at 2390. The majority thus asserted that the
reasonableness test balanced the invasion of an individual's Fourth Amendment
rights against the government's interest in upholding the law. See id.
91 See id. at 2391. Justice Scalia opined that the Fourth Amendment only protected
legitimate privacy expectations. See id. Moreover, the Court explained that the definition of legitimate varied depending on whether the individual "is at home, at work, in
a car, or in a public park." Id.
92 See id. The Court purported that parents constricted the liberty rights of minors
to the extent they were not free to come and go at their own resolution. See id. Moreover, the Justice insisted that when parents placed their children in a private school
setting, the school officials became in loco parentis. See id. Justice Scalia pointed out
that a parent:
may... delegate part of his parental authority, during his life, to the
tutor or schoolmaster of his child; who is then in loco parentis, and has
such a portion of the power of the parent committed to his charge, viz.
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and had control over students in a manner that could not be exercised with adults.9 3 Moreover, the majority suggested that privacy
expectations of student athletes were lower because athletics were
not for the timid.9 4 The Justice further stressed that students had a
decreased expectation of privacy when they chose to participate in
athletics because athletes were subject to a high standard of regulation by school officials.9 5 Therefore, the Court reasoned that the
that of restraint and correction, as may be necessary to answer the purposes for which he is employed.
Id. (quoting I WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 441
(1897)).
In contrast, the majority explained that public school officials do not merely exercise parental authority but rather act as agents on behalf of the state. See id. at 239192. To hold public school officials in the same manner as private school officials, the
majority asserted, would be inconsistent with the Supreme Court's prior rulings that
treated school authorities as state agents "for purpose of the Due Process and Free
Speech Clauses." Id. at 2392 (citing TL.O., 469 U.S. at 336).
93 See id. The majority suggested that productive educational surroundings required management of schoolchildren and enforcement of rules that would be allowable if conducted by parents. See id. Thus, the Justice proclaimed that while school
children did not relinquish their constitutional rights upon entering the school, appropriate school behavior limited their liberties. See id.; see also Hazelwood Sch. Dist.
v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988) (holding that public school officials may censor student publication as long as it is reasonably related to justifiable academic concerns); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 581-82 (1975) (explaining that due process for a
student merely required school authorities to informally review the allegation with
the student minutes after its development); Davenport v. Randolph County Bd. of
Educ., 730 F.2d 1395, 1398 (11th Cir. 1984) (upholding a school rule that required
athletes to be clean-shaven); Humphries v. Lincoln Parish Sch. Bd., 467 So. 2d 870,
872 (La. App. 1985) (upholding the removal of a school athlete for violating rule of
no facial hair during the football season); Braesch v. DePasquale, 265 N.W.2d 842,
843, 847 (Neb. 1978) (upholding a school rule that athletes could not drink, smoke,
or use drugs on school grounds).
94 See Vernonia, 115 S.Ct. at 2392. The Court suggested that the changing process
for athletes in an open locker room where students undressed and showered was
notorious for lack of privacy. See id. at 2392-93; Schaill v. Tippecanoe County Sch.
Corp., 864 F.2d 1309, 1318 (7th Cir. 1988). Moreover, the Court noted that the
locker rooms in the Vernonia schools contained no separate dressing facilities, students showered in a communal setting, and some toilets had no doors. See Vernonia,
115 S.Ct. at 2393.
95 See id.The majority highlighted numerous regulations, which the school required student athletes to comply with; student athletes must: (1) undergo a physical
examination that required a urine sample; (2) obtain insurance; (3) achieve a specific
grade point average; and (4) comply with the rules of conduct set forth under each
sport. See id. Justice Scalia compared student athletes to employees who worked in
highly regulated fields. See id. TheJustice concluded that like adults working in these
industries, student athletes should expect intrusions on their privacy due to the nature of the environment. See id. See, e.g., Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n,
489 U.S. 602, 627 (1989) (purporting that railway employees have a diminished expectation of privacy because they work in a highly regulated industry); National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 672 (1989) (explaining that custom
officials have a decreased expectation of privacy due to the nature of their work).
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in scope
invasion, through mandatory drug testing, was not severe
96
athletes.
the
by
privacy
of
expectation
given the lesser
Justice Scalia explained how the school collected urine samples and concluded that students' privacy interests were negligible. 97 Next, the Court examined the nature of information
disclosed after the administration of the urinalysis and found it restrictive because the test only determined drug use. 98 In addition,
the majority explained that the results were released to a limited
number of school personnel, rather tfian law-enforcement
officials.9 9
The Court acknowledged that the Policy was somewhat intrusive because students had to disclose to school officials any medication they currently used.' 0 0 Justice Scalia contended, however, that
the Court had never held prior disclosure of medications unreasonable.'' Moreover, the majority indicated that because the
practice of taking medical history was not stated in the Policy, students could have given pertinent medical narratives in confidence
to the lab as opposed to the school.'0 ° In sum, the Justice deemed
the invasion of privacy insignificant. 0 3
Finally, Justice Scalia averred that the government's concern
for drug-free student athletes was a compelling state interest.1 0 4
96 See Vernonia, 115 S. Ct. at 2393.
97 See id. Justice Scalia stated that the grade of intrusion depended on the monitoring process of the urinalysis. See id. For a discussion of how school officials monitored the collection of urine, see supra note 26. The majority emphasized that such
testing conditions were similar to the scenario encountered daily in public restroom
facilities. See id.
98 See id. The Justice explained that the tests were limited to detection of drug use
and would not be used to decipher whether a student was pregnant or diabetic. See id.
The Court further noted that screening of the various drugs did not vary with each
student. See id.
99 See id. The majority emphasized that the school gave the tests for the nonpunifive purpose of preventing drug use and shielding athletes from injury. See id. n.2.
Because the searches were not for evidentiary purposes, the Court determined that
probable cause was not required. See id.
100 See id. at 2394. Justice Scalia admitted that unlike Von Raab, where the railway
employer gave employees' medical history to medical personnel, the school required
student athletes to provide medical history to school officials who knew them personally. See id. The majority reasoned, however, that although the students' invasion of
privacy was greater because of the close relationship, the argument was not persuasive. See id.
101 See Vernonia, 115 S. Ct. at 2394.
102 See id. Justice Scalia noted that the Policy stated: "[s]tudent athletes who ... are
or have been taking prescription medication must provide verification (either by a
copy of the prescription or by doctor's authorization) prior to being tested." Id.

103 See id.
104 See id. at 2395. The majority explained, however, that the test mandated more
than a compelling state interest. See id. at 2394-95. The Court articulated that the test
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The Court stated that deterring school children from drugs was an
immediate concern, especially because narcotics imposed the
greatest risk to athletes.1 0 5 Refuting the argument for drug testing
based upon suspicion, the Court asserted that the least intrusive
method was not the only reasonable means under the Fourth
Amendment.10 6 In closing, Justice Scalia held that the Policy was,
constitutional due to an athlete's lesser expectation of privacy, the
10 7
limited nature of the search, and the compelling state interest.
Accordingly, the Court reversed and remanded the case to the
Ninth Circuit.10 8
Concurring in the judgment, Justice Ginsburg emphasized
that the Policy affected students who voluntarily participated in
athletics and that the most severe punishment was suspension from
the activity.' 0 9 The Justice also noted that the Court specifically left
open the issue of whether it would be constitutional to impose ranrequired that the state's interest be justifiable even though the search intruded upon
a legitimate privacy interest. See id. In comparison to Skinner and Von Raab, in which
employees were subjected to mandatory drug testing, Justice Scalia concluded that
the need to deter drug use by student athletes was equal. See id. Justice Scalia explained that children grow chemically dependent faster than adults. See id. at 2395.
The Court also asserted that all children in the school setting are affected by the drug
users. See id.
105 See id. The majority emphasized that the drugs screened by the laboratory were
dangerous to student athletes both psychologically and physically. See id. The immediacy of the need for such a Policy was apparent, the Justice explained, because the
promotion of the drug culture by student athletes caused disciplinary problems to
reach grave proportions. See id. The Justice asserted that there was an immediate
need to curb drug use among students, unlike Skinnerand Von Raab where the government's drug testing programs were initiated based upon nationwide statistics and concern for public safety. See id. Therefore, the majority concluded that the immediacy
of the program was confirmed. See id.
106 See Vernonia, 115 S. Ct. at 2396. Justice Scalia reasoned that drug testing based
upon suspicion was not plausible for several reasons. See id. First, Justice Scalia explained that many parents would not allow suspicion-based testing due to its accusatory nature. See id. Second, the Court articulated that teachers may abuse their
discretion and test troublemakers who were not drug users, which may bring law suits
to the forefront. See id. Third, Justice Scalia determined that suspicion-based testing
would burden teachers who are unprepared to effectively handle such issues. See id.
107 See id. The majority pointed out that suspicionless drug testing may not pass the
Fourth Amendment reasonableness test in other situations. See id. Further, Justice
Scalia emphasized that the most compelling factor was the government's desire to
take responsibility for schoolchildren committed to its care. See id.
108 See id. at 2397.
109 See id. (Ginsburg, J., concurring). Justice Ginsburg suggested that student athletes could easily avoid drug testing by removing themselves from interscholastic activities. See id. Moreover, Justice Ginsburg compared the instant case to United States v.
Edwards, in which the Court reasoned that airport searches of passengers and luggage
could be avoided by seeking other means of transportation. See id. (citing United
States v. Edwards, 498 F.2d 496, 500 (2d Cir. 1974)).
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dom drug testing on all students, regardless of participation in
athletics. 1 0

Justice O'Connor, joined by Justices Stevens and Souter, dissented from the Court's holding."' Justice O'Connor opined that
the majority's decision to dispense with the individualized suspicion requirement subjected millions of student athletes across the
country to an intrusive body search without any suspicion of wrongdoing. 1 2 Further, the dissent argued that blanket suspicionless
searches were acceptable under the Fourth Amendment only when
suspicion-based regimes were proven ineffective, which the majority failed to establish." 3
The dissent also declared that the Framers of the Constitution

strongly opposed general searches, as evidenced by the Warrant
Clause" 4 of the Fourth Amendment."' Justice O'Connor articulated that the Framers did not approve of general evenhanded
searches but instead chose to implement the individualized suspicion requirement. 1 6 Thus, Justice O'Connor contended that the
110 See id.

Ill See Vernonia, 115 S. Ct. at 2397 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
112 See id. Justice O'Connor declared that the majority's decision to allow
mandatory drug testing would affect 18 million public school student athletes. See id.
113 See id. at 2398 (O'Connor,J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor reiterated that blanket searches threatened citizens in greater numbers than individualized suspicionbased searches. See id. at 2397 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citing United States v.
Krull, 480 U.S. 340. 365 (1987)). Moreover, the Justice reasoned that the suspicion
requirement afforded individuals an opportunity not to act suspiciously and consequently not be searched. See id. Justice O'Connor posited that judges should not
determine search issues based on individualized suspicion-based versus non-suspicionbased regimes. See id. at 2398 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Instead, the dissent advocated that under the Fourth Amendment, courts have declared blanket searches unreasonable and exceptions applied only when other avenues were ineffective. See id.
The dissent cited Carrollv. United States for the proposition that blanket searches were
intolerable. See id. (citing Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153-54 (1925)). In
Carroll the Court held that citizens using public highways were free from searches
unless probable cause existed that the vehicle was carrying illegal alcohol. See Carroll
267 U.S. at 155-56, 162. The CarrollCourt explained that although obtaining a warrant was impractical because of time, individualized suspicion was necessary to preserve Fourth Amendment rights. See id. The CarrollCourt concluded that: "[i] t would
be intolerable and unreasonable if a prohibition agent were authorized to stop every
automobile on the chance of finding liquor and thus subject all persons lawfully using
the highways to the inconvenience and indignity of such a search." Id. (citing Carroll,
267 U.S. at 153-54).
114 See U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The Fourth Amendment provides: "and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized." Id.
115 See Vernonia, 115 S.Ct. at 2399 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
116 See id. The dissent emphasized that a recent analysis of the Founding Fathers'
original intent of the Fourth Amendment revealed that "what the Framers of the
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original Fourth Amendment standard was not evenhandedness but
protection of privacy. 117
In furtherance of the dissent's opinion, Justice O'Connor explained that suspicionless searches in the criminal context were
generally unconstitutional when exceedingly intrusive.1 1 8 Moreover, the dissent asserted that urinalysis testing was one of the most
personal searches that triggered Fourth Amendment protection. 19
Continuing, Justice O'Connor recognized that outside the criminal
context, the Court had upheld blanket searches that were distinguishable from the instant case because the searches either were
not personally intrusive or took place in a unique context. 20 The
dissent stressed that in cases in which the courts upheld suspicionless searches, the Court has continuously concluded that a suspicion-based procedure was ineffective.1 2 1 For example, the Justice
explained that the Skinner Court upheld suspicionless searches that
required drug and alcohol testing of train operators because testing at an accident scene proved unworkable.1 22 Similarly, the dissent observed that in Von Raab the individualized suspicion
requirement for drug testing custom officials was insufficient due
to the nontraditional job setting and public safety issues involved. 1 23 Likewise, Justice O'Connor insisted that in Camara the
suspicion requirement for in-home searches was impractical because the violation of building codes were undetectable from
outside the home.1 24 Furthermore, the Justice explained that in
Fourth Amendment most strongly opposed . . . were general searches-that is,
searches by general warrant, by writ of assistance, by broad statute, or by any other
similar authority." Id. at 2398 (O'Connor, J. dissenting) (citing W. CUDDIHY, THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT: ORIGINS AND ORIGINAL MEANING 1402, 1499, 1555 (1990)). The
dissent acknowledged that not all searches required individualized suspicion at the
ratification of the Fourth Amendment. See id. at 2399 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). For
example, Justice O'Connor explained that searches performed after arrests did not
require suspicion. See id. The dissent articulated, however, that suspicion-based
searches only affected individuals unlike blanket searches, which touched millions of
people. See id.
117 See id.
11 See id. at 2400 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
119 See id. The Justice recognized that the Court has declared monitoring of excretory functions highly intrusive. See id. Moreover, Justice O'Connor noted that urinalysis testing was more personal than other searches that received Fourth Amendment
protection. See id.
120 See Vernonia, 115 S. Ct. at 2400; see also New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 703
(1987) (upholding warrantless search of commercial premises); Bell v. Wolfish, 441
U.S. 520, 560 (1979) (allowing visual body cavity searches after prison visits).
121 See Vemonia, 115 S. Ct. at 2401 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
122 See id.; supra notes 69-75 and accompanying text.
123 See id.; supra notes 76-82 and accompanying text.
124 See id.; supra notes 41-46 and accompanying text.
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the preceding cases, the lack of an individualized suspicion requirement was outweighed because a single instance of wrongdo25
ing could harm many people.1
The dissent asserted that instead of using the least intrusive
means test, the majority incorrectly allowed the state to circumvent
the suspicion requirement if the state policy interests were deemed
greater than the intrusion.12 6 First, Justice O'Connor refuted the
school district's finding that suspicion-based searches were outweighed because of potential abuses by school faculty. 1 2 7 Second,
the dissent argued that the suspicion standard's adversarial nature
was no different than other disciplinary schemes enacted by school
officials.128 The Justice further proffered that while overstating the
concerns for suspicion-based searches, the school failed to address
the critical constitutional factor that suspicion-based searches were
less intrusive for millions of students who participated in school
29
athletics. 1
Continuing, Justice O'Connor reiterated that the individualized suspicion requirement may not be cast aside unless the suspicion-based standard was proven ineffective.' 30
The dissent
observed that most of the instances of drug use in the Vernonia
schools were based upon individualized suspicion that would meet
the reasonable suspicion requirement.' 3 ' Thus, the Justice proclaimed that school officials could test suspicious students for
125

See Vernonia, 115 S. Ct. at 2402 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).

126 See

id.

See id. Justice O'Connor proclaimed that the potential for faculty abuse was
limited because searches in the school setting required reasonable suspicion. See id.
For example, the Justice explained that in New Jersey v. TL.O., the Court found reasonable suspicion existed to search a student's purse for cigarettes when the school
official caught the student smoking in the bathroom. See id. (citing New Jersey v.
T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 346 (1985)). Moreover, the dissent noted that anguish concerning false accusations could be minimized by confidential testing. See id.
128 See id. Because teachers constantly decided whether to investigate wrongdoings
by students, the dissent reasoned that the custodial nature of school officials already
existed. See id. The Justice proclaimed that suspicionless searches were a trivial addition to the existing disciplinary scheme. See id.
129 See id. at 2403 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor articulated that suspicion-based searches were less intrusive because fewer students were affected and
had control over whether they were picked for a search. See id.
130 See Vernonia, 115 S. Ct. at 2403. Justice O'Connor alleged that the majority
never fully addressed whether a less intrusive method was practical. See id.
131 See id.
The Justice declared that the instances of student behavior in the
Vernonia schools would have met the individualized suspicion requirement. See id.
The Justice illustrated that: (1) students were viewed smoking marijuana; (2) students
participated in drug activity while truant; (3) students admitted using illegal substances; and (4) students were intoxicated during class. See id.
127
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drugs while protecting Fourth Amendment privileges.1 32
While acknowledging the majority's argument that students'
privacy rights were decreased in the school setting, the Justice declared that discarding the individualized suspicion requirement
left students with no Fourth Amendment protection. 3 3 Moreover,
the dissent explained that although in the past public school officials had broad constitutional leeway to carry out discipline, blanket searches of innocent students without evidence of wrongdoing
was not a traditional practice.134 Furthermore, Justice O'Connor
rebutted the majority's analogy to physical examinations by explaining that unlike the urinalysis tests, there was neither an accu35
satory nature nor punitive consequences to the examinations.
Aside from the belief that suspicionless drug testing was not
justified by the facts, Justice O'Connor set forth two other Fourth
Amendment defects in the Policy.1 6 First, the dissent contended
that there was no evidence a drug problem existed in James Acton's grade school. 137 Second, the dissent argued that the school's
choice in targeting athletes was unreasonable because insufficient
evidence existed that drug abuse caused sports injuries. 3 8 Justice
O'Connor asserted that a better alternative, which provided a con1 39
nection to drug use, was to test students who caused disruptions.
This standard, the Justice articulated, allowed dramatically fewer
students to be tested and provided students the opportunity to control the likelihood of a test through their behavior. 40 Finding
fault with the majority's rationale, Justice O'Connor pronounced
that the Policy was too broad and imprecise to survive Fourth
See id. at 2403-04 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
See id. at 2404 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
See id. at 2405 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
135 See Vernonia, 115 S. Ct. at 2405.
136 See id. at 2406 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
137 See id. Justice O'Connor pointed out that three of the four witnesses who testified were high school teachers or coaches. See id. Moreover, the dissent stressed that
the principal of the grade school who testified was formerly the high school principal
during the implementation of the Policy. See id. The dissent noted, however, that the
grade school principal alleged that the drug abuse problems did not begin at the high
school level. See id. Justice O'Connor asserted that this single piece of testimony from
the principal should not serve as the foundation for testing elementary school students. See id. Furthermore, the dissent posited that from the record, no evidence of
drug problems at the grade school level existed. See id.
138 See id. The dissent claimed that the Policy chose athletes because the district
believed that it would survive constitutional scrutiny. See id. Justice O'Connor alleged
that the actual intention of the Policy was to combat drug use school wide. See id.
132

133
134

139 See id.

140 See Vernonia, 115 S. Ct. at 2406.
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Amendment scrutiny."' The dissent therefore concluded that the
school's suspicionless searches under the Policy were not within
142
the realm of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment.
The Vernonia decision marks the first time that the United
State Supreme Court allowed random, warrantless, and suspicionless drug testing of student athletes.1 4 The Vernonia Court
faced Fourth Amendment precedent that repeatedly deferred to
school officials. 14' The Court's decision, however, allows public
school officials to egregiously overstep their authority by conducting random urinalysis drug tests on innocent student athletes
45
across the country.'
See id. at 2407 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
See id. Justice O'Connor reasoned that in times of crisis, intrusion on one's
constitutional rights was permitted when a compelling government interest existed.
See id. The dissent emphasized, however, that the Court needed to "stay close to the
record" and make judgments based on the facts alone. See id.
143 See id. at 2396; supra notes 83-142 and accompanying text.
144 See Student Athletes, supra note 24, at 225 (explaining that school officials have
received judicial deference from the Court in the past). See, e.g., Hazelwood Sch. Dist.
v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 272 (1988) (finding that school officials have prior restraint over student-written newspapers); Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S.
675, 683 (1986) (holding that school administration may determine what speech is
appropriate in the school setting); New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 342 (1985)
(recognizing that individualized suspicion may not be necessary in the school setting); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 581-82 (1975) (advocating that students' due process rights are decreased in disciplinary suspension situations).
The Court has stated that the Nation's schoolchildren are the obligations of "parents, teachers, and state and local school officials, and not of federal judges." Hazelwood Sch. Dist., 484 U.S. at 272. Moreover, the TL.O. Court declared that states and
school authorities may control student conduct in public schools. See TL.O., 469 U.S.
at 348-49. In Vernonia, the majority emphasized deference to school authorities by
stating: "We find insufficient basis to contradict the judgment of Vernonia's parents,
its school board, and the District Court, as to what was reasonably in the interest of
these children under the circumstances." Vernonia, 115 S.Ct. at 2397. This reasoning
is flawed given that "what constitutes a 'reasonable search' is a question of law and
therefore a question on which the Supreme Court owes a district court [or the school
board or parents] no deference." Student Athletes, supra note 24, at n.47 (citing
Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CMI. L. REv. 1175, 1181-82
(1989)).
145 See supra note 24 and accompanying text; see also Ellen M. Alderman, Note, Dragnet Drug Testing in Public Schools and the FourthAmendment, 86 COLUM. L. REv. 852, 853
(1986) (asserting that mandatory drug tests are not justifiable in the school setting
under the reasonableness standard); Drug Testing-Student Athletes, 109 HARv. L. REv.
220, 229 (1995) (maintaining that the Vernonia Court's decision stretches the meaning of the Fourth Amendment); Hagge, supra note 8, at 583 (articulating that the
Vernonia decision has disabled citizens from maintaining uniform protection of privacy rights under the Fourth Amendment); Darrel Jackson, The ConstitutionExpelled:
What Remains of Student's Fourth Amendment Rights?, Note and Comment, 28 ARiz. ST.
L.J. 673, 697 (1996) (declaring that the Court's holding in Vernoniaweakens the Constitution's ability to preserve individual privacy rights from the government); Recent
Case, Search and Seizure-SuspicionlessDrug Testing-Seventh Circuit Upholds Drug Test141
142
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Although it seems that public school administrations can declare a victory in Vernonia, Fourth Amendment jurisprudence is far
from resolved. Analysis of the Court's opinion illustrates the divergence between the majority and dissent concerning the critical issue of whether the individualized suspicion requirement should
apply. The majority concluded that the suspicion requirement was
not always necessary under the reasonableness standard of the
Fourth Amendment.1 4 6 The dissent, however, advocated that the
Framers' intent of individualized suspicion was paramount and
should be implemented in Vernonia's Policy.' 4 7 Although Justice
Scalia admitted that there was no recognizable Fourth Amendment
standard in the school setting regarding the suspicion requirement, the majority chose to look at past cases for guidance in lieu
of the Framers.' 4 8 Moreover, Justice Scalia dishonored the constitutional concerns of minors by incorrectly claiming that suspicionbased drug testing of students may be impossible.' 4 9 Thus, the Jusing of Student Athletes in the Public Schools, 103 HARV. L. REv. 591, 596 (1989) [hereinafter Suspicionless Drug Testing ] (proffering that random, suspicionless drug testing of
student athletes was unconstitutional in the school setting); Samantha Elizabeth Shutler, Random, Suspicionless Drug Testing of High School Athletes, 86J. CiuM. L. & CRIMINOLocY 1265, 1302 (1996) (advocating that random drug testing regimes are performed
at the expense of childrens' Fourth Amendment rights).
146 See Vernonia, 115 S. Ct. at 2396; supra note 106 and accompanying text.
147 See id at 2398-99 (O'Connor, J,. dissenting); supra note 116 and accompanying
text.
148 See id. at 2390. Justice Scalia, however, has not always overlooked the Framers
intent in conjunction with the Fourth Amendment. See California v. Avecedo, 11 S.
Ct. 1982, 1992 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring) (asserting that a warrant requirement
was not necessary because the Fourth Amendment resonates the Framers' intent to
.preserve the jury's role in regulating searches and seizures"); see also Hagge, supra
note 8, at 583 (explaining that the Vernonia decision "represents the final blow to the
intent of the Framers regarding individualized suspicion").
149 See Vernonia, 115 S. Ct. at 2396. Justice Scalia's reasons for not applying the
suspicion-based test were illusory as noted by Justice O'Connor in the dissent. See id.
at 2402-03 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); supra note 126-135 and accompanying text.
First, the majority's reasoning that suspicion-based drug testi'q would not be accepted by parents is unfounded because if individualized susl.cion existed, public
school officials would have a constitutional right under the Fourth Amendment to
conduct the test. See Vernonia, 115 S.Ct. at 2396. Second, Justice Scalia's accusation
that teachers could purposefully test troublesome students is degrading to school officials nationwide. See id. Moreover, teachers could not abuse their power to test troublesome students because under the suspicion-based regime, individualized suspicion
must be proven. See id. at 2402. (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Third, the Justice asserted that teachers were "ill-prepared" to look for drug abuse in conjunction with
their daily duties. See id. at 2396 (Scalia, J., concurring). This notion by Justice Scalia
is unconvincing because no one is better equipped to detect suspicious behavior than
teachers who see the students everyday. See Alderman, supra note 145, at 873. Moreover, teachers have daily contact with the students and are often able to detect even
the slightest changes in their "emotional, physical, and academic behavior." See id.
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tice disregarded the heralded tradition of looking to the authors of
the Constitution and improperly approached the case in a utilita50
rian manner.
Without a suspicion-based test, courts will have carte blanche authority to determine the Fourth Amendment balancing test in the
school setting, which will promote unnecessary judicial activism.' 5
The majority's reasonableness test is too easily tipped in favor of
school officials.' 5 2 After all, the balancing test purported by the
Court is biased against the individual student athletes whose privacy rights are unequivocally overshadowed by society's aggregate
needs.1 53 Therefore, a suspicion-based regime for drug testing disruptive and suspicious students would achieve Vernonia's goal to
eliminate drug use without denying innocent students' privacy
54
rights. 1
Although few would disagree that the war on drugs is fought
Furthermore, school authorities have the opportunity to observe suspicious students
for a long period of time to help discern if drug abuse is occurring. See id. Thus,
school officials are in the absolute best position to determine suspicious activity
among students. See id.; see alsoJackson,supra note 145, at 690 (explaining that teachers must be able to detect drug use because the Vernonia schools believed, due to
reported incidents by teachers, that drug abuse was a problem).
150 See Laurence H. Tribe, ConstitutionalCalculus: EqualJustice or Economic Efficiency.',
98 HARv. L. REv. 592, 608 (1985). Although Tribe does not address drug testing in
the school setting, his analysis of the Court's reasoning applies to the Vernonia decision. See id. at 606-07. For example, Tribe illustrates the Court's unconvincing utilitarian approach to Fourth Amendment jurisprudence by noting the decision in United
States v. Leon, 104 S. Ct. 3405 (1984). See id. InLeon, the Court held that suppressed
evidence under the exclusionary rule was admissible if a good-faith belief existed as to
the validity of the warrant. See id. at 3415-16. Tribe concludes that the Court merely
looked at the cost of enforcing the Fourth Amendment, which would allow criminals
to go free, and weighed it against the benefit of "vindicating the Bill of Rights and
avoiding judicial complicity in denying the 'security' from 'unreasonable searches and
seizures' promised by the Fourth Amendment." Tribe, supra, at 607. Moreover, Tribe
astutely acknowledges: "[A]ny means of enforcing the [F]ourth [A]mendment will
necessarily lead to the capture and punishment of fewer criminals-for although the
exclusionary rule does indeed deprive the courts of some highly probative evidence,
so too does police compliance with [the] amendment's warrant and probable cause
requirements." See id. at 608. Because drug testing student athletes is good for the
society as a whole (it may decrease drug abuse and ultimately crime), the Court decided that the cost of protecting students' individual constitutional rights was too
high. Thus, the Court applied a utilitarian approach and found that society would
best be served if random, suspicionless drug testing was performed.
151 See Alderman, supra note 145, at 862 (alleging that the reasonableness test affords too much judicial discretion to the courts); Hagge, supra note 8, at 565 (maintaining that the reasonableness test diminishes individuals' protection under the
Fourth Amendment).
152 See Employee Drug Testing, 103 HARv. L. REv. 269, 278 n.78 (1989).
153 See id.
154 SeeJackson, supra note 145, at 690.
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everyday in our schools, the issue is to what extent government may
be involved. 55 In the instant case, the majority's argument that
Vernonia's drug testing initiative was necessary because of dire circumstances is unconvincing. 5 6 As asserted by the dissent, the majority required neither an evidentiary showing that drug use
reached epidemic proportions at Acton's grade school level,' 5 7 nor
compelling statistics that athletic injuries were caused by drug
abuse. 158 This blatant disregard of critical issues provokes the question of whether the majority aimed its decision at curbing overall
159
student drug use as opposed to preventing athletic injuries.
Although the state does have responsibility of minors in the public
school setting, the Court has the more consequential obligation to
look out for the well-being of the Nation's children under the Constitution.16 0 Individual liberties come at a price and society inevitably pays the bill. 6 ' It is critical, however, to teach children respect
See Suspicionless Drug Testing, supra note 145, at 597.
See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
157 See id. at 2406; supra note 137 and accompanying text.
158 See id. at 2389. The Court acknowledged the following to prove athletes were
being injured by drug use: "The high school football and wrestling coach witnessed a
severe sternum injury suffered by a wrestler, and various omissions of safety procedures and misexecutions by football players, all attributable in [their] belief to the effects of drug use." Id. (emphasis added). Although more evidence was included in
the district court's transcripts, such evidence was still meek. See Acton v. Vernonia
Sch. Dist., 796 F. Supp. 1354, 1357 (D. Or. 1992). Specifically, the only other purported evidence of drug use by student athletes was that alcohol was consumed on a
bus after a sporting event, and in another instance, some student athletes after a track
meet stole alcohol from a grocer. See id.
159 See Vernonia, 115 S. Ct. at 2395. The majority consistently cited to the compelling interest as "deterring drug use by our Nation's schoolchildren," instead of focusing on preventing student athletic injuries. See id. Moreover, when determining the
efficacy of the issue, Justice Scalia incorrectly compared the government interest in
Vernonia to Skinner and Von Raab. See id. In Von Raab, the Court held that custom
officials in drug interdiction and firearms could be drug tested absent a warrant or
probable cause. See National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656,
677 (1989). Unlike the situation in Vernonia where only several students were allegedly injured by drug use, the Von Raab Court explained that the lives of all Americans
were at stake if custom officials abused drugs. See id. at 671. Similarly, the potential
amount of people injured by drug-induced train operators in Skinner amounted to
thousands, while student athletes that were hurt in comparison was minimal. See Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 633-34 (1989). Likewise, Shuder
asserts that "none of the justifications for random, suspicionless testing enunciated in
Skinner and Von Raab exist in the public school setting." Shutler, supra note 145, at
1291. Moreover, "school activities do not pose risks to national security or public
safety comparable to [Skinner and Von Raab ]." Id.
160 See Student Athletes, supra note 24, at 229.
161 See Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 329 (1987); see also Carol S. Steiker, Second
Thoughts About First Principles, 107 HARv. L. REv. 820, 821 (1994) (noting that critics
are questioning the price society pays for Fourth Amendment protections).
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for the personal rights of the next generation.1 62 Sadly, a major
casualty in the war against drugs are our children's personal
liberties.
Rachel L. Diehl

162 See Alderman, supra note 145, at 863 (proffering that constitutional freedoms
should be carefully assessed in the school context because schools are educating students for citizenship); Suspicionless Drug Testing, supra note 145, at 597 (advocating
that society must teach children constitutional safeguards to ensure respect for future
generations); West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943)
(proposing that in order for students to respect the Constitution, school boards must
protect students' constitutional rights).

